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The 1974 decisions thus indicate that as new types of transactions
arise, courts will continue to interpret and apply the Howey criteria
liberally in an effort to protect all investors." In light of recent devel-
opments, the following may provide a current formulation of the
original Howey guidelines: a security is the investment of money or
its equivalent in a venture, with some expected beneficial return,
wherein the investor exercises no more than minimal managerial
control.
II. THE 140 SERIES RULES
In spite of their relatively short history or perhaps because of it,
there were few significant developments in 1974 regarding the rules
in the 140 series. The most noteworthy developments were the adop-
tion of two new rules, Rules 146 and 147. Rule 146' is a codification
of various objective guidelines for compliance with the "non-
public"offering exemption under §4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.2
Rule 1471 is an attempt to clarify the SEC's position regarding the
intrastate offering exemption of §3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act. Despite the
significant guidelines provided by both Rules, many problem areas
remain. Litigation concerning the previously adopted rules, Rules
1444 and 145,1 was notably absent. However, SEC staff replies in 1974
existence of a rental arrangement in a condominium would not result in the creation
of an "investment contract." The economic benefits of the rental arrangement must
have been represented to the purchasers through advertising, etc., prior to any sales,
before a sale of securities occurs, This approach indicates the importance of the poten-
tial investor being induced to make his investment. But see text accompanying notes
28-30 supra.
41 See Mocatta Metals Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 79,940 (SEC Staff Reply
July 1, 1974) (call options on silver are not securities); Idea Research & Dev. Inc.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,759 (SEC Staff Reply Mar.
8, 1974) ("memberships" in an organization which evaluated ideas and inventions and
sought promoters in the market, are securities); Rare Metals Inv. Corp., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,752 (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 26, 1974)
(silver rental contracts are securities); International Silver Soc'y Ltd., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,732 (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 22, 1974)
(memberships in a silver society are securities).
17 C.F.R. §230.146 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rule 146]. See SEC Securities
Act Release No. 33-5487, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974).
2 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1970).
3 17 C.F.R. §230.147 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rule 147]. See SEC Securities
Act Release No. 33-5450, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2340 (Jan. 7, 1974).
17 C.F.R. §230.144 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rule 144]. See SEC Securities
Act Release No. 33-5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,487
(Apr. 15, 1972).
1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
provide new guidelines for compliance with Rule 144, which regulates
the sale of "restricted" and "control" securities.
A. Rule 146
Rule 146 represents an attempt by the SEC to alleviate some of
the confusion which arose from the various decisions applying §4(2).'
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,7 the United States Supreme Court
stated that "the applicability of [§4(2)] should turn on whether the
particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act.",
The Supreme Court stressed two requirements which, if satisfied,
would eliminate the need for statutory protection: (1) the offerees
must be able to "fend for themselves;"9 and (2) the offerees, as a
result of their positions in the company, must "have access to the
same kind of information that the Act would make available in the
form of a registration statement."1"
The requirements formulated in Ralston have been strictly ap-
plied," with most courts mandating that the factors stressed by the
Supreme Court be satisfied with respect to each offeree before the
exemption is available."2 In considering these factors, courts have
examined the relationship between the offering firm and the offerees3
and the "sophistication" of the offerees in investment matters, 4 as
3 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1974). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5316, [1972-
1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,015 (Oct. 6, 1972).
1 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Continental To-
bacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d
1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680
(5th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
346 U.S. 119 (1953).
8Id. at 125. Since the expenses involved in registration are great, it would be
overly burdensome to impose the registration requirement in situations where investor
protection is unnecessary.
"Id.
10 Id. at 125-26 (footnote omitted).
" See, e.g., Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 632 (10th Cir. 1971).
2 Id. at 633.
13 The SEC and the courts have developed a few factors for determining whether
an offering is public in nature: (1) the number of offerees; (2) the relationship among
the offerees; (3) the relationship between the offerees and the issuer; (4) the number
of shares offered; and (5) the manner of the offering. See Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC
Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions From Registra-
tion For the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622, 624 (1974). For a more detailed
listing of the various judicially required elements in a valid private placement, see
Erwin, Marketing Investment Condominiums and Real Estate Syndications without
Securities Registration: SEC Rule 146, 3 REAL EsT. L.J. 119, 123 (1974).
1 See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
1975]
732 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
well as offeree access to certain pertinent information concerning the
issuer.'5
Rule 146 loosens the "sophistication" requirement by permitting
a person who is wealthy but unsophisticated in investment matters
to appoint an "offeree representative" as advisor.'" The Rule also
adopts the requirement of access to and availability of pertinent in-
formation,'7 and limits the manner in which offerings may be made.,8
Although the Rule restricts the number of purchasers to thirty-five, 9
an unlimited number of offerees is permitted.
Despite the substantial clarification provided by Rule 146, numer-
ous problem areas remain. Uncertainty continues with respect to
such issues as: (1) the meaning of the term "sophistication; '"20 (2) the
frequent reference to "reasonableness" as a standard;2 and (3) a
consideration of the duty, if any, which an offeree representative owes
the offeree he is representing.22 The question of integration of offer-
Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971).
, Rule 146(a)(1).
Prior to adoption of Rule 146, the Fifth Circuit determined that the sophistica-
tion of the investor was not alone sufficient. Reasoning that sophistication without the
necessary information was useless, the court concluded that the offeree must also have
access to the critical information. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th
Cir. 1972).
It is interesting to note that while an offeree representative may satisfy the Rule's
requirement by being furnished with information concerning the corporation, he may
not satisfy the requirement by merely having access to that information. Rule
146(e)(1). See text accompanying notes 32-34 infra.
ZR Rule 146(c).
" This restriction was recently amended to abolish the absolute thirty-five pur-
chaser requirement, and now merely states that the issuer must have reasonable
grounds to believe there are only thirty-five purchasers. Rule 146(g)(1). See SEC Se-
curities Act Release No. 33-5585, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,168 at 85,313-14 (May
7, 1975).
In a recent staff reply, the SEC stated that non-resident aliens who acquire securi-
ties of an issuer "in an offering made in reliance upon Rule 146 need not be included
in the computation used to determine compliance with the thirty-five purchaser re-
quirement of Rule 146(g)(1)." Salt Cay Beaches Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,985
(SEC Staff Reply Sept. 12, 1974).
" The Rule allows more than one person to act as offeree representative for an
offeree, and their collective expertise may satisfy the sophistication requirement. Also,
the offeree may provide some expertise for establishing a "collective sophistication"
with his representative. See Rule 146(a)(1)(ii) and (d)(2)(ii).
21 Rule 146(a)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (f)(3), and (h).
2 Another question in this regard is whether, in the case of two or more persons
acting as offeree representatives, any duty is owed among the representatives them-
selves, i.e., is an accountant required to disclose certain information to the attorney
working with him, so that the lawyer can provide adequate legal counsel, or is the
lawyer required to procure his own information.
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ings also remains a problem" despite the discussion in the prelimi-
nary notes to Rule 146, which indicates that reference should be made
to the factors enumerated in a prior Securities Act Release for deter-
mining integration. 4
The "sophistication" requirement as presently formulated under
the Rule is satisfied if the offeree is either "capable of evaluating the
merits and risks of the prospective investment," or "able to bear the
economic risk of the investment."2 However, both criteria pose diffi-
cult questions: when is an offeree capable of making the proper evalu-
ation, and when is an offeree economically able to bear investment
risks? Presumably, the offeree must be more sophisticated than the
average investor, since it is the average investor that the securities
acts were intended to protect. On the other hand, it can hardly be
contended that only a securities dealer should be able to satisfy the
"sophistication" requirement."
The use of "reasonableness" as a standard throughout the Rule
at least implicitly recognizes the defense of good faith effort on the
part of the parties involved in certain cases of technical non-
compliance with the Rule. A case decided before promulgation of
Rule 146 supports this conclusion. In Livens v. William D. Witter,
Inc.,21 the district court, after considering the traditional §4(2) re-
quirements, stated that although the offeree lacked access to certain
information which registration would have disclosed, the information
was of minimal importance and was therefore not per se fatal to the
exemption claim. Presumably, the same argument may be made
under Rule 146. Subsection (e)(1) of the Rule states that an offeree
must have access to the required information, "to the extent that the
issuer possesses such information or can acquire it without unreason-
able effort or expense."2 The Livens decision thus provides a basis
for arguing that an issuer should expend greater effort in providing
offerees with important information than in providing them with
non-essential, although technically required, information." By em-
23 See Rule 146(b)(1).
24 Rule 146, Preliminary note 3. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1 CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 2770-83 (Nov. 6, 1962).
21 Rule 146(d)(1)(i).
21 Rule 146(d)(1)(ii).
" Numerous responses to the proposed versions of the Rule suggested "that spe-
cific types of persons such as lawyers, accountants, stockbrokers, and investment
bankers" automatically qualify as offeree representatives. Note, SEC Rule 146-The
Private Placement Exemption, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1125, 1147 (1974).
I CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,906 (D. Mass. Sept. 6, 1974).
21 Rule 146(e)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
31 One commentator has suggested: "Thus, the use of such phrases and the ambi-
1975]
734 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
ploying this flexible standard, the magnitude of the error can be
considered and a determination made whether rescission of the trans-
action or loss of the exemption is an appropriate sanction.
Rule 146 provides no guidelines for determining what duty an
offeree representative owes his offeree. However, by comparing the
proposed" and revised 2 versions with the Rule as finally adopted an
inference can be drawn. Prior to adoption, the Rule stated that the
disclosure requirement was satisfied if an offeree representative had
access to the type of information a registration statement would have
revealed.3 The present Rule eliminates this method of fulfilling the
disclosure requirement and provides that an offeree representative
must be furnished with the information. This change may indicate
SEC concern that merely requiring access by the representative does
not adequately protect the offeree, since his representative may not
investigate the accessible information.u
Although Rule 146 provides a "safe harbor" for securities sold in
compliance with its provisions," it is purported not to be the exclu-
sive means by which an issuer can qualify for the non-public offering
guity of the conditions themselves suggest that in practice the defense of an innocent
and immaterial error may be available to the issuer. However, the Commission has not
explicitly declared whether or not such a defense will be recognized." Note, SEC Rule
146-The Private Placement Exemption, 58 MINN. L. REv. 1125, 1139 (1974).
In recent amendments to Rule 146, the SEC has revised the furnishing of informa-
tion requirement under subsection (e)(1)(ii) to permit non-reporting issuers under
(e)(1)(ii)(b) to omit non-material information from that required to be furnished to an
offeree or his representative. See Rule 146(e)(1)(ii)(b). See also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 33-5585, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 80,168 at 85,312-13 (May 7, 1975). This
revision permits greater flexibility for issuers, and is in keeping with the good faith
argument discussed in the text.
' First Proposed SEC rule 146(e)(1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972).
32 Second Proposed SEC rule 146(e)(1)(i), 38 Fed. Reg. 28951, 28956 (1973).
- The first proposal of Rule 146(e)(1) reads as follows:
Each offeree or his investment representative [offeree representa-
tive] shall, during the course of the negotiated transaction;
(1) Have the same kind of information that the Act would make
available in the form of a registration statement, to the extent such
information is available, or have access to such information;
Rule 146(e)(1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972) (emphasis added).
34 With regard to the revised proposed Rule, Mr. John Merow, an attorney for
Sullivan & Cromwell in New York City, stated before the Fifth Annual Institute on
Securities Regulation that a standard of negligence should be imposed on the offeree
representative in the performance of his function. Mr. Merow posited that "the per-
formance of the offeree representative may also be tested against such provisions as
Rule 10b-5 and the general provisions relating to investment advisor conduct." PLI
FirH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SEcurnmas REGULATION, Transcript at 368 (1974).
3 Rule 146(b).
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exemption. The preliminary note to Rule 146 states specifically that
issuers may continue to sell securities outside of the Rule if they
comply with traditional requirements for application of the §4(2)
exemption.1 However, consideration of the problem of "creeping ex-
clusivity" which has accompanied development of Rule 144 belies
this non-exclusivity of Rule 146. Rule 144 similarly provides that non-
compliance with the Rule does not preclude qualification for the ex-
emption. However, replies and releases by the SEC subsequent to the
adoption of Rule 144 indicate that persons attempting to establish an
exemption outside of the Rule must overcome a presumption of non-
compliance. A similar presumption may arise under Rule 146.
B. Rule 147
The SEC in 1974 also adopted Rule 14711 which provides guide-
lines for compliance with the intrastate offering exemption of
§3(a) (11) of the 1933 Act. The Rule adheres to the long line of preced-
ent which established that the exemption is only available for the
local financing of companies primarily intrastate in character.,, Be-
cause of the narrow provisions of the Rule, it provides a very limited
safe harbor under the §3(a)(11) exemption. 9
Despite Rule 147's attempt to clarify the §3(a)(11) exemption, two
major problem areas exist with respect to the Rule's application. Rule
147 unnecessarily burdens the issuer with a provision which requires
Is Rule 146, Preliminary Note 1.
37 For a general discussion of Rule 147 and its origins see Gardiner, Intrastate
Offering Exemption: Rule 147-Progress Or Stalemate? 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 340 (1974);
Kant, SEC Rule 147-A Further Narrowing of The Intrastate Offering Exemption, 30
Bus. LAW. 73 (1974); Comment, SEC Rule 147-Distilling Substance From the Spirit
of the Intrastate Exemption, 79 DICKINSON L. REv. 18 (1974).
u SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5450, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2253 (Jan.
7, 1974). The Rule requires that the issuer conduct a certain percentage of its business
within the state. For SEC replies to questions concerning the Rule's "doing business"
requirement, see Jones, Crouch, McCarty & Bannasch, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,822 (SEC Staff Reply May 3, 1974); CoinVest, Inc., [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,823 (SEC Staff Reply Apr. 8, 1974)
(purchase and sale of coins, etc. outside of the state does not prevent the corporation
from meeting the "doing business" requirement); Robert Enright, [1973-1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,714 (SEC Staff Reply Jan. 10, 1974) (use of
investors' funds for trading in commodities futures contracts on exchanges outside of
the state).
" Rule 147 presents an identical problem of "creeping exclusivity" discussed with
regard to Rule 146, see text accompanying note 36 supra, despite the SEC's express
assertion that no presumption against availability of the exemption arises upon non-
compliance with Rule 147. Rule 147, Preliminary Note 1.
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that the offerees, as well as the purchasers, be residents of the same
state as the issuer, and the state in which the offering occurs." An-
other problem unresolved by the Rule involves situations in which
residents purchasing securities under installment plans move to an-
other state before completing their payments. Various courts had
previously found that in such circumstances the exemption is de-
stroyed since a sale is not completed until final payment is made.4'
There is no indication that this policy has been changed, despite the
Rule's lack of clarity on this particular issue.2
The primary difficulty with Rule 147 is its extremely restrictive
provisions which will probably greatly limit its use by issuers.43 Fur-
thermore, the problem of creeping exclusivity which analysis of devel-
opments under Rule 144 indicates may arise under Rule 147, will
dissuade issuers from attempting to invoke the intrastate offering
exemption outside of the Rule. Thus, compliance with the provisions
of Rule 147 may become the sole means of qualifying for the intra-
state offering exemption, with the result that the overall availability
of the §3(a)(11) exemption will be severely restricted.
,1 Rule 147(d). One commentator has suggested that this requirement is mis-
placed since not all offerees will become purchasers, and the purpose of the intrastate
exemption would seem equally furthered by merely requiring the purchasers to be
residents. See Hicks, Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1974).
By comparison, Rule 146 considers the number of offerees to be irrelevant since ade-
quate restrictions exist with respect to the purchasers.
Similarly, in the proposed version of the recently adopted Rule 240, see notes 58-
59 infra, the SEC placed a limitation on the number of purchasers and the number of
beneficial owners. However, the SEC concluded that the purchaser limitation was not
necessary in light of the limitation on beneficial owners, and therefore dropped the
requirement from the Rule as finally adopted. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-
5560, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,066 at 84,949 (Jan. 24, 1975).
The American Law Institute, in its Fourth Tentative Draft of the Federal Securi-
ties Code, has provided a definition of "local distributions" which imposes no offer
requirement and applies merely to sales. Furthermore, the proposal allows sales in
areas in adjoining states without defeating the exemption. The proposed section on
"local distributions" is generally more ambiguous and allows for greater flexibility
than Rule 147. See ALI FED. SEC. CODE, §513 (Apr. 1, 1975 Draft).
" Cf. United States v. Kormel, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 275, 278 (D. Nev. 1964); note
63 infra. But see In re Whitehall Corp., 3 SEC 259, 269 (1956).
1' The resolution of this issue may depend on the conditions of the purchase. If
the purchaser can stop payment at any time and retain a pro rata share of the securities
he has paid for, this seems to indicate that each installment represents a new purchase
and thus, once the purchaser becomes a non-resident, the exemption is destroyed.
See Fraidin, Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 30 Bus. LAW. 313,
324 (1974).
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C. Rule 144
Rule 144 applies primarily to the sale of "restricted" securities
which traditionally have included securities obtained in a chain of
transactions not involving any public offering.44 The Rule imposes
numerous conditions on public sales by control persons ("affiliates")
and holders of privately placed or restricted securities, to insure that
a public distribution does not occur. 5 The Rule requires that: (1)
adequate public information concerning the issuer be available;" (2)
the securities be held for two years before resale;47 (3) a limited num-
ber of "control" or "restricted" securities be sold during any six-
month period;" (4) the sales be made in ordinary brokerage transac-
tions;"9 and (5) except for small sales, the seller file a notice of sale
with the SEC.50
In 1974, the SEC adopted a number of amendments to Rule 14451
in an attempt to clarify the Commission's position with respect to
resales under the Rule. 2 Subsection (c) (1) dealing with the availabil-
ity of adequate public information concerning the issuer, was
amended to permit compliance when the issuer "has been subject to
the reporting requirements of section 13 of [the Act of 1934] for a
period of at least 90 days immediately preceding the sale of the secur-
ities and has filed all the reports required to be filed thereunder
during the 12 months preceding such sale." 3 The amendment re-
moves the burden placed on the issuer by the old Rule which provided
that all statements ever required of the issuer be on file.
Subsection (e) (3) (G) of the old Rule provided that securities sold
pursuant to an effective registration or in reliance on a Regulation A
" One question, as yet unresolved, is whether the Rule applies to securities which
were sold in a purported private placement which did not comply with the necessary
private offering exemption, and therefore, were sold illegally. See generally Lipton,
Fogelson & Warnken, Rule 144-A Summary Review After Two Years, 29 Bus. LAW.
1183, 1185 (1974).
45 Section 4(1) exempts "transactions by any person other than an issuer, under-






" SEC Securities Act Release No. 5452, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 79,633 (Feb. 1, 1974).
12 It is important to remember that while Rules 146 and 147 apply to initial
offerings, Rule 144 merely applies to resales.
-" Rule 144(c)(1). Concurrently, Forms 10-Q and 10-K were amended to conform
to the changes in subsection (c)(1).
1975]
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or §4(2) exemption should not be included in calculating the number
of securities which may be sold under the Rule. The amended subsec-
tion (e)(3)(vii) now excludes §4 transactions generally from the re-
quired calculation, rather than restricting the exclusion to §4(2)
transactions. 4 This change is apparently to avoid the problem of
"creeping exclusivity" by permitting a person to sell shares under the
other §4 exemptions and outside of Rule 144, without affecting sales
under the Rule.
As currently amended, subsection (g)(2)(iii) permits broker-
dealers under certain conditions to continue their quotations in an
inter-dealer quotation system while selling securities pursuant to the
Rule.5 The broker may make inquiries of customers who have indi-
cated a bona fide unsolicited interest in the securities within 10 days
preceding the receipt of orders to sell securities pursuant to Rule
144.56 The SEC revised subsection (h) to require that all amended
notices of a proposed sale be transmitted on Form 144 to the principal
stock exchange on which the securities to be sold are listed.
Furthermore, Rule 144 was amended to provide that securities
sold pursuant to the new Rule 240 would be deemed "restricted"
securities for the purpose of Rule 144. Rule 240 provides "an exemp-
tion from registration. . . for limited offers and sales of small dollar
amounts of securities by an issuer that before and after the transac-
tion pursuant to the rule has a limited number (100) of beneficial
owners of its securities."" As was the case with Rules 146 and 147,
the purpose of adopting Rule 240 was to allow small businesses to
raise capital when "because of the small size and limited character
of the offering, the public benefits of registration are too remote."'59
Clarification of Rule 144 in 1974 also came from SEC staff replies"0
5' Rule 144(e)(3)(vii). For a discussion of this change see generally Schwartz, Rule
146: The Private Offering Exemption-Historical Perspective and Analysis, 35 OHIO
ST. L.J. 738, 750-52 (1974).
3 This change was intended to increase the liquidity of the investments "both of
persons desiring to resell securities pursuant to Rule 144 through the broker and of
other persons who are deprived of the service of a market-maker." SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5452, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,633 at
83,699 (Feb. 1, 1974).
Rule 144(g)(2)(ii).
5' Rule 144(h).
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5560, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 80,066, at 84,945
(Jan. 24, 1975), effective March 15, 1975.
51 Id. Rule 240 applies solely to issuers and is not available to affiliates of the issuer
or other persons in the resales of securities.
11 The SEC has reiterated its policy of refusing to answer no-action requests re-
garding Rule 144. See Kane-Miller Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
which indicate the SEC's position on such matters as computation
of "holding" and "tacking" periods, what are "restricted" securities,
and computation of other time limits under the Rule. The majority
of requests for SEC interpretations in 1974 concerned the holding
periods for "restricted" securities.' The SEC reaffirmed its position
on the issue of fungibility, 2 that any securities other than those to
be sold under the Rule which are acquired by the issuer during the
two-year holding period will not start the holding period running
anew. The SEC has also continued to allow tacking of holding periods
under certain circumstances." However, with respect to determining
the time for commencement of holding periods, the Commission has
made a notable change. In 1973 the Commission stated that when
employees received with certain limitations shares in a company with
which they were employed," the holding period would commence
L. REP. 79,747 (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 22, 1974).
1, Rule 144(a)(3) defines "restricted securities." See Ag-MET, Inc., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,796 (SEC Staff Reply Apr. 2, 1974)
(short positions in issues taken by market-maker will not affect holding period for
issuer's shares held in investment account of market-maker when certain conditions
are met).
1Z SeeNLT Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,710
(SEC Staff Reply Jan. 11, 1974) (holder of securities purchased in single block may
sell those which were fully paid for more than two years previous, even though other
securities in the block remain unpaid). The doctrine of fungibility states that a subse-
quent acquisition of "restricted securities" requires commencement of a new holding
period as to all previously acquired "restricted securities." This position was explained
in the release adopting the Rule. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-5223, [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REp. 78,487 (Jan. 11, 1972).
13 See Dolman, Kaplan, Neiter & Hard, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 79,789 (SEC Staff Reply Mar. 29, 1974) (divorced woman who received
restricted securities from her ex-husband as part of the property settlement may tack
her holding period to that of her husband). In this case, the SEC also considered the
question of how many securities the wife may resell without violating the provisions
of Rule 144(e). The SEC replied that the divorced woman was not required to aggregate
her sales during any six-month period with those of her husband, provided they did
not act in concert. Their divorce was considered to present a rebuttable presumption
against any concerted action.
" The employees were permitted to purchase the shares with the restriction that
they were not to be sold or hypothecated for three years. These restrictions would lapse
as to 1/5 of the shares purchased upon expiration of each year in a period, for example,
between the third and seventh years after the shares were acquired. Therefore, until
the end of the seventh year, there would be some securities subject to restrictions.
Furthermore, if the employee's employment was terminated at any time prior to the
end of the third year, the employer had a 30-day option to repurchase all the shares
at the employee's cost plus interest. At any time after the three years, while the
employee retained restricted securities, the employer had the same purchase option
but only as to those shares which remained restricted.
1975]
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when they acquired the shares, if they retained beneficial ownership
of the securities thereafter. 5 Recently, however, the Commission has
stated that the important consideration in such cases is when the
purchase price is fully paid,6 rather than when the purchaser ac-
quires beneficial ownership. Because the 1973 position effectuated
the Rule's purpose of subjecting the purchaser to the risks of his
investment and prevented him from becoming a conduit for a public
distribution, it is unclear why the SEC imposed a stricter require-
ment in 1974.7
Rule 144 applies to securities which were not acquired through
any public distributions. 8 However, a recent reply by the SEC states
that securities originally sold in a public offering, which were ac-
quired by an affiliate of the issuer in a transaction effected on a
national exchange, and subsequently sold to another affiliate in a
non-public transaction, are "restricted" securities despite the fact
that they were originally publicly traded. 9
11 Warner Communications, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,463 (SEC Staff Reply July 16, 1973); Kappa Sys., Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,491 (SEC Staff Reply July 5, 1973).
" In Bourns, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,820
(SEC Staff Reply Dec. 27, 1973), the SEC considered §83 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which provides for the deferral of tax liabilities in those cases in which property
is still subject to substantial risk of forfeiture. The SEC noted that risk of forfeiture
was defined in the Code as a conditioning of rights in the property "upon the future
performance of substantial services by an individual," (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§83(c)(1)), and stated that the holding period would therefore not commence until the
full purchase price had been paid. Finding that "the restrictions on disposition of the
stock purchased under the Bourns plan are not to be lifted as to each portion of the
shares until additional consideration is forthcoming," namely, the additional years of
employees' services, the SEC stated that full consideration is not paid until the restric-
tions are lifted. Bourns, Inc. at 84,220-84,221. See Ralph M. Parsons Co., [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 79,821 (SEC Staff Reply Feb. 7, 1974).
17 In 1973 the SEC stated that subjecting the investor to the risks of his investment
was the Commission's major concern and so long as the purchaser had beneficial
ownership of the stock, he was subject to such risks. Even the 30-day option would not
prevent the assumption of risk since the employer was not required to exercise his
option. The difference in the two approaches is that in 1974 the SEC analyzed the issue
before it in terms of the Internal Revenue Code, since the reason for the plan was to
avail the purchasers of the tax deferral under §83.
" The Rule is generally not applicable to securities acquired in reorganizations.
But see American Commonwealth Financial Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,659 (SEC Staff Reply Dec. 5, 1973) (SEC stated that "persons
who do not receive an amount of securities which is substantial in relation to the
amount of securities issued in the reorganization and who are not affiliated with [any
companies involved] may resell their shares in reliance upon the exemption provided
by §4(1)").
11 See Citizens & So. Realty Investors, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 79,980 (SEC Staff
1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
In addition, subsection (c)(1) of the Rule provides added protec-
tion for Rule 144 purchasers by prohibiting an issuer from making any
sales under the Rule until a registration statement filed by the issuer
has been in effect 90 days. To effectuate this purpose of disclosure,
the SEC has vigorously reaffirmed its position that the 90-day re-
quirement will not commence until the registration statement be-
comes effective.
7 0
Although SEC staff replies were the primary source of clarifica-
tion of Rule 144 in 1974, the Southern District of New York recently
decided a case involving the 90-day requirement under subsection
(c) (1) of the Rule.7' In that case the district court held an issuer liable
under both securities acts for failure to disclose in a prospectus the
possibility that 90 days after registration "restricted" securities could
be sold pursuant to Rule 144.72 Basing its decision on judicial inter-
pretation of the "materiality" of a misstatement or omission," the
court concluded that, depending on the number of unregistered
shares outstanding, failure to disclose the possibility of a sale of these
shares under Rule 144 was a material omission.
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D. Conclusion
While both Rules 146 and 147 provide "safe harbors" for the §4(2)
and §3(a)(11) exemptions under the 1933 Act, Rule 147 is more re-
strictive and it is likely that issuers will avoid the use of this exemp-
tion. Rule 146, however, is drafted broadly enough to allow flexibility
in its interpretation and implementation by the courts. Nevertheless,
the problem of "creeping exclusivity" exists under both Rules, and
in light of the development of Rule 144, a presumption against availa-
Reply July 31, 1974).
" Thus, although the wording of subsection (c)(1) was changed in 1974, see note
55 supra, this requirement has not changed. See DuFour, Levy, Marx, Lucas & Os-
borne, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,826 (SEC Staff Reply
May 2, 1974).
1' Langert v. Q-1 Corp., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,445 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1974).
n The prospectus did state that "the unregistered shares could not be disposed of
in a 'public distribution' unless covered by a registration statement." Id. at 95,539.
However, the court noted that the average investor is unfamiliar with the phrase
"public distribution" as a term of art, and therefore, concluded that the above disclo-
sure was insufficient. Id.
n A misstatement or omission is "material" if a reasonable man would attach
significance to it and would have acted differently had he known this fact. See, e.g.,
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362-63 (2d Cir. 1973).
74 94,445, at 95,539.
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